IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LYCOMING COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,	:	CR-2024-1150
	:	
vs.	:	
	:	
NYREESE TURNER,	:	
Defendant.	:	Omnibus Pretrial Motion

OPINION AND ORDER

BACKGROUND:

This matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on November 25, 2024, on the Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion, filed October 2, 2024, and Supplemental Omnibus Pretrial Motion, filed October 23, 2024 (hereinafter the "Motion"). The Motion seeks relief as follows: Count I asserts a claim that Nyreese Turner (hereinafter "Defendant") was the subject of an unconstitutional search and seizure. Count II asserts a claim that the evidence upon which the Commonwealth relies is insufficient to establish a *prima facie* case. Count III seeks to compel discovery. Count IV is a motion to dismiss charges under both the United States Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution.

At the hearing conducted on November 25, 2024 (hereinafter the "Hearing"), counsel for Defendant withdrew Count III of the Motion.

Due to the January 13, 2025 decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in *Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police*, this Court permitted the Commonwealth and Defendant to submit supplemental briefs or memoranda in response to the ruling in *Lara*—both counsel submitted supplemental letters on February 18, 2025. 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025).

On March 7, 2025, this Court entered an Order, providing notice to the Office of the Attorney General (hereinafter "OAG") of the constitutional claims raised by the Defendant. The Court further provided the OAG an opportunity to comment or intervene in the above-captioned matter within sixty (60) days of the date of filing of the Order. Having received no written comment or notice of intervention from the OAG, the Court now renders the following Opinion and Order.

The Testimony

The testimony introduced by the Commonwealth at the Hearing revealed as follows:

Officer Nicholas Carrita of the Williamsport Bureau of Police (hereinafter "Carrita") testified that, on August 4, 2024, he was dispatched to a call regarding a stolen bicycle. Notes of Testimony (hereinafter "N.T.") at 5. As he responded, he came upon four (4) young adults who appeared much like juveniles. *Id.* One of the individuals threw what appeared to be a sweatshirt into nearby bushes. *Id.* at 9. Another of the individuals wearing khaki pants (later determined to be Jamir Lewis) flagged down Carrita and "he asked me what I was doing and why I was harassing them." *Id.* at 11-12. Carrita advised him that those four (4) individuals fit the description of persons involved in the theft of a bicycle. *Id.* at 12.

Carrita circled his vehicle and continued to observe the four (4) individuals. *Id.* at 15. At one point another officer of the Williamsport Bureau of Police stated by radio that one of the persons involved in the bicycle theft was wearing khaki pants. *Id.* Carrita drove back to the area of Memorial Avenue and found that other officers were talking to three (3) of the four (4) individuals. *Id.* at 16. Carrita then returned to the location where he observed one of the individuals threw a sweatshirt, but could not locate it. *Id.* at 16-17.

Officer Brandon Wheeler of the Williamsport Bureau of Police (hereinafter "Wheeler") testified that on August 4, 2024, he was dispatched to a call regarding a stolen bicycle. *Id.* at 22. As he was arriving, he received a description of the stolen bicycle, and he located the stolen bicycle laying on the side of the road near the location of the theft. *Id.* at 23. He returned the bicycle, and viewed Ring camera footage captured at the home where the theft occurred. *Id.* That Ring camera footage was displayed during the hearing. *Id.* at 24. The footage revealed the presence of several young persons, including a young black individual wearing khaki pants. *Id.* at 24-25. The individual wearing khaki pants removed a bicycle from the porch of the victim. *Id.* Wheeler radioed a description of the individual, which was the radio transmission earlier described by Carrita. *Id.*

Wheeler heard that other officers had detained a group of four (4) individuals, including the suspect of the theft. *Id.* Wheeler went to that location. *Id.* at 26. A bodycam video captured

on Wheeler's bodycam on that date was displayed during the hearing. *Id.* Wheeler testified that the three (3) individuals who were detained were the individuals he observed in the Ring camera footage. *Id.* at 27.

While the officers were speaking to the three (3) detained individuals, Corporal Jordan Stoltzfus of the Williamsport Bureau of Police (hereinafter "Stoltzfus") was arranging for a computer check of Jamir Lewis (the individual wearing the khaki pants, hereinafter "Lewis") for any active warrants. *Id.* at 28. Wheeler observed that Lewis was holding "bundled up jackets." *Id.* At one point, Stoltzfus pulled Lewis aside to re-check the spelling of his name. *Id.* At that time, Lewis passed the jackets to the Defendant. *Id.* 28-29. Carrita advised Wheeler that Carrita did not locate the sweatshirts which had been thrown into nearby bushes. *Id.* at 31. After Lewis passed the jackets (actually sweatshirts) to the Defendant, Wheeler became concerned about potential presence of weapons. *Id.* at 35. For that reason, Wheeler requested that the Defendant "shake out" the sweatshirts. *Id.* at 36.

When the Defendant shook out the first sweatshirt, it hung down in front of her. *Id.* at 43. When she shook out the second sweatshirt, she appeared to support both the bottom and the top of it. *Id.*

Corporal Stoltzfus testified that he was working on August 4, 2024, received the call regarding the stolen bicycle, and was searching for the suspects. *Id.* at 45. Stoltzfus made contact with three (3) individuals, including Lewis and the Defendant. *Id.* Lewis appeared to be carrying a sweatshirt "that he had balled up. He was carrying it like a football." *Id.* at 46. When Stoltzfus determined that Lewis fit the description for the person who stole the bicycle, he took Lewis aside to speak to him privately. *Id.* At that point, Lewis handed off the sweatshirt to the Defendant. *Id.* Stoltzfus heard Wheeler ask the Defendant to shake out the sweatshirt. *Id.* It appeared to Stoltzfus that the Defendant "kind of grabbed a chunk of—a portion of the sweatshirt, and in my eyes, to hold what was in the sweatshirt to avoid it from falling out when she shook the sweatshirt." *Id.* at 48. Stoltzfus further testified that "I could see that she was in multiple ways attempting to hold something in that sweatshirt, and by my observation of—I thought it was a firearm the way she had both hands on it, so I became concerned that she was manipulating a firearm, which kind of – which put us in danger." *Id.* at 49.

Based upon the way that the Defendant was manipulating the sweatshirt, Stoltzfus grabbed what the Defendant was grabbing and "immediately could tell that it was a firearm" based upon the feel of the object. *Id.* The firearm was seized, resulting in the charges filed in this matter. *Id.* at 50-51. The Commonwealth subsequently discovered that the manufacturer's serial number on the firearm was altered to the point that it cannot be read.

The Information

The Defendant is charged at Count I of the Information with a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), Possession of Firearm Prohibited. It is undisputed that the Defendant has a prior record of possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver, and thus is not legally permitted to possess a firearm. The Defendant is charged at Count II of the Information with a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.2(a), possession of a firearm with an altered, changed, removed, or obliterated manufacturer's serial number. The Defendant is charged at Count III of the Information with a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1), carrying a concealed firearm without a license.

ISSUES PRESENTED:

1. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH RELIES IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A *PRIMA FACIE* CASE.

2. WHETHER DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARM LOCATED WITHIN THE POCKET OF A SWEATSHIRT ALLEGED TO BE IN HER POSSESSION.

3. WHETHER THE STATUTES WHICH FORM THE BASIS OF THE THREE COUNTS IN THE INFORMATION ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

RESPONSE TO ISSUES PRESENTED:

1. THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH RELIES IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A *PRIMA FACIE* CASE.

2. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARM LOCATED WITHIN THE POCKET OF A SWEATSHIRT ALLEGED TO BE IN HER POSSESSION.

3. THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS' RULING IN *LARA V. COMMISSIONER PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE* REGARDING 18 PA.C.S. § 6106 IS DISTINGUISHABLE, BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT WITHIN THE EIGHTEEN (18)-TO-TWENTY (20)-YEAR AGE GROUP AT THE TIME OF THE AUGUST 2024 INCIDENT; FURTHER, THE REMAINING STATUTES IN QUESTION ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

DISCUSSION:

1. THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH RELIES IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A *PRIMA FACIE* CASE.

When the illegal possession of contraband is charged, the evidence must establish that the defendant "[h]ad a conscious dominion over the contraband." *Commonwealth v. Fortune*, 318 A.2d 327, 328 (Pa. 1974) (citing *Commonwealth v. Davis*, 280 A.2d 119 (Pa. 1971). In this matter, the Defendant cannot be convicted of any of the charged offenses unless the finder of fact is convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she was in knowing possession of the firearm. Defendant contends that the testimony is insufficient to establish a *prima facie* case of a knowing possession. The Court does not agree.

Our Superior Court, in *Commonwealth v. Dantzler*, opined the following regarding pre-trial *habeas corpus* motions and the sufficiency of evidence to establish a *prima facie* case:

> We review a decision to grant a pre-trial petition for a writ of *habeas corpus* by examining the evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth. *Commonwealth v. James*, 863 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc). In *Commonwealth v. Karetny*, 583 Pa. 514, 880 A.2d 505 (2005), our Supreme Court found that this Court erred in applying an abuse of discretion standard in considering a pre-trial *habeas* matter to determine whether the Commonwealth had provided *prima facie* evidence. The *Karetny* Court opined, "the Commonwealth's *prima facie* case for a charged crime is a question of law as to which an appellate court's review is plenary." *Id*. at 513, 880 A.2d 505; *see also Commonwealth v. Huggins*, 575 Pa. 395, 836 A.2d 862, 865 (2003) ("The question of the evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth's *prima facie* case is one of law [.]"). The High Court in *Karetny* continued, **"[i]ndeed, the trial court is afforded no discretion in ascertaining whether, as a matter of law and in light of the facts presented to it, the**

> **Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial, *prima facie* burden to make out the elements of a charged crime.**" *Karetny*, supra at 513, 880 A.2d 505. Hence, we are not bound by the legal determinations of the trial court. To the extent prior cases from this Court have set forth that we evaluate the decision to grant a pre-trial *habeas corpus* motion under an abuse of discretion standard, our Supreme Court has rejected that view. *See id.*
>
> A pre-trial *habeas corpus* motion is the proper means for testing whether the Commonwealth has sufficient evidence to establish a *prima facie* case. *Carroll*, supra at 1152. **"To demonstrate that a *prima facie* case exists, the Commonwealth must produce evidence of every material element of the charged offense(s) as well as the defendant's complicity therein." *Id*. To "meet its burden, the Commonwealth may utilize the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and also may submit additional proof." *Id*.**

Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1111-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (*en banc*) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); *see, e.g., Commonwealth v. White*, 2024 WL 2991903, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024) (citing *Commonwealth v. Dantzler*, 135 A.3d 1109, 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016)) ("We review a decision to grant a pre-trial petition for a writ of *habeas corpus* by examining the evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth.").

It appears to the Court that there is little direct evidence of a knowing possession. The law of Pennsylvania, however, permits a finding of guilt based upon circumstantial evidence alone, and intent may be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances. *Commonwealth v. Williams*, 362 A.2d 244, 248 (Pa. 1976) (citing *Commonwealth v. Shaffer*, 288 A.2d 727 (Pa. 1972), *Commonwealth v. Roscioli*, 309 A.2d 396 (Pa. 1973), and *Commonwealth v. Thomas*, 239 A.2d 354 (Pa. 1968)).

The Commonwealth's testimony was that Stoltzfus heard Wheeler ask the Defendant to shake out the sweatshirt. It appeared to Stoltzfus that the Defendant "kind of grabbed a chunk of—a portion of the sweatshirt, and in my eyes, to hold what was in the sweatshirt to avoid it from falling out when she shook the sweatshirt." N.T. at 48.

The finder of fact may reasonably conclude that the manner in which the Defendant held the sweatshirt and the manner in which she kept the firearm from falling out was

circumstantial evidence that she was attempting to conceal an illegal firearm from law enforcement. While the finder of fact may conclude that the evidence is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is certainly sufficient to establish a *prima facie* case.

2. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUPPRESSION OF THE FIREARM LOCATED WITHIN THE POCKET OF A SWEATSHIRT ALLEGED TO BE IN HER POSSESSION.

The Commonwealth contends that Defendant lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in the sweatshirt/jacket which contained the firearm, since the circumstantial evidence suggests that it was owned by Lewis. Com.'s Br. at 1. In the matter of *Commonwealth v. Shabezz*, 166 A.3d 278 (Pa. 2017), our Supreme Court recognized the dichotomy between standing (the constitutional entitlement to seek relief from an allegedly illegal search or seizure) and the reasonable expectation of privacy. 166 A.3d at 286. The "automatic right of standing" by a defendant charged with any possessory offense has been abandon by the federal courts. *Id.* at 285 (citing *United States v. Salvucci*, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) and *Rawlings v. Kentucky*, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980)). In contrast, automatic standing has been recognized by our Supreme Court under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. *Id.* at 286 (citing *Commonwealth v. Knowles*, 327 A.2d 19, 21-22 (Pa. 1974)).

While the Defendant clearly has standing to assert the claims asserted in the Motion, the question remains whether Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the two-part test enunciated in *Shabezz*. 166 A.3d at 286-88. The Court concludes that she did not. There is no evidence to support a finding that Defendant had any privacy interest in either the jacket/sweatshirt first possessed by Lewis, or in the firearm. While Defendant is charged with possession of the firearm, the evidence suggests that Lewis owned the jacket/sweatshirt, and by implication, the firearm within the jacket.

While the Court finds no basis in the evidence to support a reasonable expectation of privacy by the Defendant, the Court will analyze the search as if the Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

When Officer Wheeler joined the officers who were speaking to Lewis and Turner and

Dymeck, he stated aloud that Lewis was the individual suspected of the bicycle theft. N.T. at 26-28. Stoltzfus then took Lewis aside to question him privately. *Id.* at 28. At that point, the officers had concrete evidence to support detaining Lewis as the person responsible for the bicycle theft. At the Hearing on the Motion, Wheeler testified on cross-examination that Lewis (the individual wearing khaki pants) became the focus of the investigation, and that "So the other -- the other two could have left at any time? Correct. Yeah, they weren't -- they weren't being questioned or anything at that point. So the only -- the only individual at that point you were focusing on was Mr. Lovecchio's client, unfortunately, correct? I assume -- Lewis, right? Then, yes, Lewis." *Id.* at 34-35.

Despite the fact that the Defendant was not being arrested or questioned or otherwise detained, she elected to remain with Lewis and Dymeck. Officer Wheeler's statement aloud that Lewis was the person suspected of the bicycle theft should have led everyone present to suspect that Lewis may soon be placed under arrest. That suspicion would have been further confirmed when Stoltzfus took Lewis aside to question him privately. *Id.* at 28. At that moment, Lewis passed the "balled up" sweatshirts/jackets to the Defendant. *Id.* at 28-29, 46. The only reasonable conclusion to draw Lewis's action is that the sweatshirts/jackets contained something that Lewis did not want the officers to find. Since the offense under investigation was a bicycle theft, there was no reason to suspect that Lewis was hiding evidence. The reasonable inference is that he was hiding other contraband, or a weapon.

After Lewis passed the "balled up" sweatshirts/jackets to the Defendant, Wheeler asked her to "shake them out." *Id.* at 28-29, 36, 46. When Wheeler was asked "Why did you ask Ms. Turner to shake out the sweatshirts?", he stated "Because for safety reasons, so I know or not there was a weapon inside or not." *Id.* at 30. In response to the follow up question "In your experience, is it -- in your experience is it sometimes common for individuals to try to distance themselves from thing that they shouldn't have?", Wheeler responded "Yes." *Id.*

At the time that Stoltzfus asked to speak to Lewis privately, the Defendant was not being detained, and only Lewis was the focus of the investigation. Only when Lewis decided to pass the "balled up" sweatshirts/jackets to the Defendant did the attention of Wheeler turn to the Defendant. *Id.* at 28-29, 36, 46. Wheeler explained why he asked the Defendant to "shake-

out" the sweatshirts/jackets. *Id.* at 30. When the Defendant shook out the first sweatshirt, it hung down in front of her. *Id.* at 43. When she shook out the second sweatshirt, she appeared to support both the bottom and the top of it. *Id.*

Stoltzfus testified that the Defendant "kind of grabbed a chunk of -- a portion of the sweatshirt, and in my eyes, to hold what was in the sweatshirt to avoid it from falling out when she shook the sweatshirt." *Id.* at 48. Stoltzfus further testified that "I could see that she was in multiple ways attempting to hold something in that sweatshirt, and by my observation of -- I thought it was a firearm the way she had both hands on it, so I became concerned that she was manipulating a firearm, which kind of -- which put us in danger. *Id.* at 49.

It is the settled law of this Commonwealth that a police officer "[m]ay pat-down an individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating on the basis of a reasonable belief that the individual is presently armed and dangerous to the officer or others." *Commonwealth v. Cunningham,* 287 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022) (citing *Commonwealth v. Gray*, 896 A.2d 601, 605-06 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)). Here, Officer Wheeler attempted to recover the sweatshirt/jacket which Lewis threw into bushes, but could not find it. N.T. at 16-17. At the time that Stoltzfus asked to speak to Lewis privately, Lewis was the focus of the investigation, and the Defendant was free to leave. *Id.* at 28. At that moment, the officers had no basis for detaining the Defendant, or conducting any search of her. When Lewis realized that he was likely to be taken into custody, he passed off to the Defendant two (2) "balled up" sweatshirt/jackets which he was "carrying like a football." *Id.* at 28, 46. That caused the officers to return their attention to the Defendant. Wheeler asked her to "shake-out" the two (2) "balled up" sweatshirt/jackets. *Id.* at 30, 43. Her subsequent behavior gave the officers a reasonable basis to suspect that she was actively concealing contraband, or a weapon, or both.

The Court notes that Pennsylvania has rejected the so called "automatic companion" rule, permitting a "pat-down" of any companion within the immediate vicinity of an arrestee. *See Commonwealth v. Graham*, 685 A.2d 132, 135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (footnote omitted) ("[T]he "automatic companion rule" is contrary to both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions."), *rev'd on other grounds*, 721 A.2d 1075 (Pa. 1998). A frisk of a companion is permissible, however, where police have a reasonable suspicion, based upon articulable facts,

that criminal activity may be afoot, and that the arrestee's companion may be armed and dangerous. *In re N.L.*, 739 A.2d 564, 568 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).

For the reasons discussed above, the officers had clear concrete evidence that Lewis was responsible for a bicycle theft. At first, the officers had no basis for suspecting that his companion, the Defendant, was armed and dangerous. Thereafter, because of Lewis's conduct of passing off the two (2) "balled up" sweatshirt/jackets to the Defendant—N.T. at 28, 46—and because of the Defendant's behavior in manipulating the sweatshirt/jackets, the officers had both a reasonable basis to conclude that Lewis had committed a bicycle theft, and that Lewis passed off a concealed weapon to the Defendant.

3. THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS' RULING IN *LARA V. COMMISSIONER PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE* REGARDING 18 PA.C.S. § 6106 IS DISTINGUISHABLE, BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT WITHIN THE EIGHTEEN (18)-TO-TWENTY (20)-YEAR AGE GROUP AT THE TIME OF THE AUGUST 2024 INCIDENT; FURTHER, THE REMAINING STATUTES IN QUESTION ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

In the matter of *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc., v. Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022), the United States Supreme Court held that the guarantees of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution protect the rights of ordinary, law-abiding citizens, and thus that any federal or state regulation of the right to possess or carry a firearm must be consistent with our nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Commonwealth contends that the offenses charged in the Information are within that tradition. Defendant contends that they are not. 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2022).

In the matter of *U.S. v. Rahimi*, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by a defendant subject to a protection from abuse order "fits neatly within the tradition" of historic firearm regulation, and that "Our tradition of firearm regulation allows the Government to disarm individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others." 602 U.S. 680, 698, 700, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1901-02, 219 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2024).

The brief submitted by the Defendant in support of the Motion contains a thorough discussion of post-*Bruen* federal jurisprudence. While Defendant's brief does not include this

citation, the Court notes that on January 13, 2025, in the matter of *Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police*, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit—on a remand from the United States Supreme Court—concluded that Pennsylvania's "[18 Pa.C.S.] §§ 6106, 6107, and 6109 – when combined with a state or municipal emergency declaration – have the practical effect of preventing most 18-to-20-year-old adult Pennsylvanians from carrying firearms", therefore the above statutory scheme is inconsistent with "[t]he principles that underpin founding-era firearm regulations[.]" 125 F.4th at 431-32, 445.

In the instant case, Defendant is charged with a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), Possession of Firearm Prohibited, a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.2(a), possession of a firearm with an altered, changed, removed, or obliterated manufacturer's serial number, and a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1), carrying a concealed firearm without a license. This Court notes that while the *Lara* Court opined that the combined §§ 6106-6107-6109 statutory scheme is constitutionally infirm, nothing in the authority submitted by the Defendant leads the Court to conclude that any of the other offenses are beyond the scope of "our nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." 602 U.S. at 681; 125 F.4th at 428, 431-33, 446. Further, the Defendant was not within the eighteen (18)-to-twenty (20)-year age group at the time of the August 2024 incident, therefore *Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police* is distinguishable from the matter at hand. *See* 125 F.4th at 438 (footnote omitted) ("We therefore reiterate our holding that 18-to-20-year-olds are, like other subsets of the American public, presumptively among 'the people' to whom Second Amendment rights extend.").

ORDER

AND NOW, this 19th day of May, 2025, for the reasons more fully set forth above, Defendant's Motion (filed October 2, 2024, and October 23, 2024) is DENIED.

BY THE COURT,

William P. Carlucci, Judge

WPC/aml

cc: Court Administrator
Lycoming County District Attorney's Office (JF)
Matthew Diemer, Esquire